Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense

[TangoTwoBravo]

I have seen this occur a number of times now on large CAXs / TEWTs including once with the USMC. Either the battle handover line was in the wrong place, there was confusion over where the battle handover line was or the commander launched the countermove too fast. All three situations result in a goat rodeo. 

Although we seldom practice how to gracefully recover from a tactical fumble, this would be one scenario that I would talk though with your team. What happens if the countermoves force is committed too early? How will I know they were committed too early? How will I recover? What are the options to prevent the rodeo?

Good discussion.  Enjoy following.

MC

I was lucky to have two weeks in Fort Knox with my squadron on the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). Its a system of linked tanked simulators. We did a Mobile Defence four times before I got it close to being right (plenty of fumbles on my part). A US Army Colonel was watching us with my Sqn 2IC from the control room. As we trudged into the AAR room yet again he said supportively "The Mobile D - its a tough one! You got this!" The ability to watch your failure on the replay, talk about it, come up with a fix and then try it out was outstanding. We did finally get it.

Timing is everything with countermoves. And good gunnery.

The covering force battle can be fairly low-key with just observation forward (unlikely but possible) or be an involved battle with significant combat power withdrawing under pressure/in contact. The battle handover is when everything can come apart.

 

[ballz]

I'll offer the following carrots to munch on:

1.  If you need to "preemptively employ countermoves, after the covering force crosses the battle handover line, to reinforce against or block the enemy and prevent him from finding the path of least resistance," (to paraphrase your first statement) then you've probably set your battle handover line in the wrong place.  If I was planning a defensive fight, I would not want a "break" in contact between the covering force and the main defensive force during the defensive battle.

I agree to an extent, and in saying so I don't think I've ever seen a well-coordinated handover occur in the few opportunities I've had to do this on exercise against a real enemy force, but even if the covering force hands over perfectly to the main defensive area... my understanding of the battle unfolding is that the enemy isn't sending in all of his elements head-first at once to slam into the area defensive. It's coming in waves, probing and defining the position, over the course of days, maybe even weeks, one "failed" attempt after another, before it finally launches into decisive action. So the covering force has been relieved but the enemy is still defining/probing... it's wishful thinking to think we've got enough resources to cover all avenues of approach / bypass routes... therefore, we've got to have something to convince him away from certain routes... this is where I think blocking countermoves come in pre-emptively.

This whole conversation makes me wish we were standing at a whiteboard with a map of Wx and some staedlers!

2.  If you have "12 different counterattack tasks on your countermoves matrix," (to paraphrase your next statement) then you're probably mishandling your reserve.  The last thing you want to do is fritter it away piece meal reacting to every enemy action considered a threat.  "Firebase positions and attack positions" are things you deal with through your direct and indirect fire plans, not by committing your reserve.

This, I guess, is where I'm saying I don't think of my countermoves as a reserve, and I really don't like the idea of your "reserve" being tasked with your primary countermoves that you know are vital to your plan. This is where my article speaks about a "manouevre force" as opposed to grouping LAVs into direct fire and countermoves. I had 13x LAVs. I didn't need them all for direct fire, in fact with the piece of ground a company has I couldn't possibly use them all (we only had 6x positions to fire from). I had the resources to do both and thinking of the entire fleet as a "manouevre force" would give me the flexibility. I think this could be achieved at higher levels, with more resources like tanks, and would be effective. I mean, there is nothing good for the enemy in being formed up in the attack position, waiting for the obstacle breach to open up, and getting flanked by a troop of tanks... even if it just takes out 4x vehicles in the AP... a small force could really disrupt at a key moment.

3.  The way you frame your argument seems to argue that an area defence (as portrayed in Land Ops) is too reactive in blocking/reinforcing and waiting for the big counterattack at the end.  If I read it right, you are arguing for "using offensive action in the defence" and that constant counter-movement (for lack of a better term) would be implicit in an "offensive defence."  Are you just indicating a preference for mobile defence over area defence?

No... I mean I probably would prefer the former if I got to choose the terrain as you indicate, that rarely happens. I'm talking about all those things in context of using them in an area defence.

4.  The primary reason I would argue that you wish to avoid committing your reserve early (in either a mobile or an area defence) is that you tip your hand.  This goes back to Old Dead Carl and the very reason we find ourselves on the defence in the first place.  We are on the defence because something is preventing us from going to the offence.  That something is probably a correlation of forces, or we'd probably just take to the offence ourselves.  The defensive concept is parrying a blow, the characteristic, awaiting the blow, the object, preservation.  I need the enemy to wear himself down, commit his reserve, limit his freedom of action, and in doing so culminate so I can then act to take the initiative.  This is when I introduce my reserve, for if I introduce it earlier, I'm probably doing what the enemy is looking for - he'll then commit his reserve to run my committed forces over and achieve breakthrough/breakout.  In all higher level exercises I've been exposed to, we try to get the defending enemy to commit his reserves so we can destroy them and take advantage of the loss of freedom of action he now faces.  If he commits them early, so much the better.

I completely agree with all this. I guess this is where I'm getting at with not agreeing with doctrine that I should be relying on my reserve to conduct countermoves. For me, in my planning, countermoves is vital, it's my main effort. I'll take troops out trenches, I'll take vehicles off of positions, I'll dedicate more resources to sensors, etc... to ensure I can fulfill all of my countermoves plan. To me, that is not my reserve, or as you say, I'm already committed to committing my reserve before I even start.

In the end, I'll again offer my opinion that the Canadian doctrine is a bit simplistic due to our institutional unfamiliarity with sustained defensive operations and the relatively low level that it concerns itself with.  It's not in our heritage or collective memory.  If you want a good synopsis of the state of the art with all the nuances of different defensive approaches, here's a good read.

Definitely lots of reading to be done on this, and hopefully more discussions stirred up. I can't say enough how much this conversation requires a beer, a map, and a whiteboard (or maybe cider and cigars to drive home the "nerdy officer" stereotype).

 

[ballz]

I was lucky to have two weeks in Fort Knox with my squadron on the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). Its a system of linked tanked simulators. We did a Mobile Defence four times before I got it close to being right (plenty of fumbles on my part). A US Army Colonel was watching us with my Sqn 2IC from the control room. As we trudged into the AAR room yet again he said supportively "The Mobile D - its a tough one! You got this!" The ability to watch your failure on the replay, talk about it, come up with a fix and then try it out was outstanding. We did finally get it.

It's a crime against the Queen that we don't use JCATs more for that kind of stuff. All because of "costs" while we're turning in money left right and centre, unable to spend it.

 

[b00161400]

I had the opportunity the other day to get out to a Second World War Nazi-Soviet battlefield around the small hamlet of More here in Latvia.  It gave me the opportunity to think on a few of the issues we've discussed here.  The position had very little depth but it did have a small reserve which counter attacked on numerous occasions to regain lost positions

The defence has a few common tasks that are related: depth, c-movs (block, reinforce, c-atk), reserves, and c-penetration.  Over this year this raised a few questions for me.  What does depth actually do?  What do reserves do?  Does the reserve do c-movs or do they need to be separate tasks?  How are all these concepts related?

Doctrinally the reserve does c-movs which makes sense at the Coy lvl and below where your reserve is likely to be reactive.  Above that where you might have a deliberate c-atk planned this makes less sense as your reserve shouldn't have a planned task and in many cases the c-atk will be the decisive act so the reserve would end up being your main effort even before commitment.  If you have to use that reserve to restore a situation in a blocking or reinforcing task that means you lose your main effort in trying to salvage a situation.  This tells me that any echelon that plans to launch a decisive c-atk probably needs a reserve separate from the c-movs force.  So, coys and below most of the time will only need a reserve.  Having said that, if you're a BG or higher and achieving your mission doesn't revolve around launching a decisive c-atk then you probably just need a reserve to block and reinforce as well.  This was noted earlier by Tango2Bravo.

I think depth posns as they are conventionally understood in Canadian doctrine and in practice take part in the direct fire fight.  At least depth sections, platoons, and Coys.  They service KZ's.  They fire between or around forward posns but they also offer a base of fire for local c-atks.  This may in fact be their more important function.  At the Coy level it seems to me that a small reserve that can move rapidly to a penetration, in conjunction with a depth BP that can immediately bring effective fires on to the enemy that has broken into one of the lead platoons would be a good combination.  That depth BP could then be prepared to follow and sp the reserve as required to complete the ejection of the enemy from the lead position.

In writing this it occurred to me that depth may actually be your best sub unit.  As the organisation likely to be least engaged they are the most likely to be thrown around the battlefield on blocking and reinforcing tasks.  If they draw the bulk of the patrols then they will likely find themselves with a multitude of conflicting tasks as they patrol while trying to complete defensive preparations.

Often you'll hear about a counter penetration plan.  I'd suggest this is just a counter moves task as it's a mix of blocking, reinforcing, and local counter atk to retake a lost posn.  As discussed above this could be a combination of both depth and a reserve/c-movs force.  The depth provides support while the reserve/c-movs blocks, reinforces, or c-atks.

At levels where there is a planned c-atk then as part of the c-movs plan both the reserve and the c-atk force need to be included, with the reserve conducting primarily blocking and reinforcing and c-movs conducting the decisive c-atk.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I had the opportunity the other day to get out to a Second World War Nazi-Soviet battlefield around the small hamlet of More here in Latvia.  It gave me the opportunity to think on a few of the issues we've discussed here.  The position had very little depth but it did have a small reserve which counter attacked on numerous occasions to regain lost positions

The defence has a few common tasks that are related: depth, c-movs (block, reinforce, c-atk), reserves, and c-penetration.  Over this year this raised a few questions for me.  What does depth actually do?  What do reserves do?  Does the reserve do c-movs or do they need to be separate tasks?  How are all these concepts related?

Doctrinally the reserve does c-movs which makes sense at the Coy lvl and below where your reserve is likely to be reactive.  Above that where you might have a deliberate c-atk planned this makes less sense as your reserve shouldn't have a planned task and in many cases the c-atk will be the decisive act so the reserve would end up being your main effort even before commitment.  If you have to use that reserve to restore a situation in a blocking or reinforcing task that means you lose your main effort in trying to salvage a situation.  This tells me that any echelon that plans to launch a decisive c-atk probably needs a reserve separate from the c-movs force.  So, coys and below most of the time will only need a reserve.  Having said that, if you're a BG or higher and achieving your mission doesn't revolve around launching a decisive c-atk then you probably just need a reserve to block and reinforce as well.  This was noted earlier by Tango2Bravo.

I think depth posns as they are conventionally understood in Canadian doctrine and in practice take part in the direct fire fight.  At least depth sections, platoons, and Coys.  They service KZ's.  They fire between or around forward posns but they also offer a base of fire for local c-atks.  This may in fact be their more important function.  At the Coy level it seems to me that a small reserve that can move rapidly to a penetration, in conjunction with a depth BP that can immediately bring effective fires on to the enemy that has broken into one of the lead platoons would be a good combination.  That depth BP could then be prepared to follow and sp the reserve as required to complete the ejection of the enemy from the lead position.

In writing this it occurred to me that depth may actually be your best sub unit.  As the organisation likely to be least engaged they are the most likely to be thrown around the battlefield on blocking and reinforcing tasks.  If they draw the bulk of the patrols then they will likely find themselves with a multitude of conflicting tasks as they patrol while trying to complete defensive preparations.

Often you'll hear about a counter penetration plan.  I'd suggest this is just a counter moves task as it's a mix of blocking, reinforcing, and local counter atk to retake a lost posn.  As discussed above this could be a combination of both depth and a reserve/c-movs force.  The depth provides support while the reserve/c-movs blocks, reinforces, or c-atks.

At levels where there is a planned c-atk then as part of the c-movs plan both the reserve and the c-atk force need to be included, with the reserve conducting primarily blocking and reinforcing and c-movs conducting the decisive c-atk.

A wise Gunner (yes, there are a few) once explained to me that if you can't move because of the enemy's artillery fire on our MLD, you are depth. If you can, you are counter-move/attack.

 

[b00161400]

This Cbt Tm in Ops Pam I'm reviewing explicitly states that depth should be included in the counter moves plan.  I'm pretty sure that's the only place I've seen that.

I think a depth sub unit as part of a BG could quickly find themselves overwhelmed with the number of tasks given if the expectation that they do everything that a c-movs force has to do along with preparing a BP and conducting patrolling.  It'd be great to find a good historical vignette on this....

 

[Old Sweat]

I remember attending a 3 CIBG officers study group on the counterattack in Gagetown circa 1963-1964. The brigadier made the point that a forward battalion would be unable to counterattack within its own area, but might be able to block an advance. Even the brigade group could only mount a viable counterattack with a battle group and only then if the mission had been previously detailed in orders and the unit had time to plan and practice it. Anything else could require the commitment of troops from a formation not yet in contact.

This seems to fly in the face of the lessons of history, but he was trying to make a point about the limitations of a brigade group.

There is an example in my history of The Royal Winnipeg Rifles. Shortly after D Day in Normandy the battalion had advanced and occupied its final objective of Putot on 7 June. Incidentally, it was the first Allied unit to capture its final objective. Now the division had been training for the invasion and move forward to its objectives for several months, but had not spent much, if any, time practicing the defence. Things went amiss when it was attacked by 2nd Battalion, 26 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and things went all to crap. The situation was only restored by a counterattack by the Canadian Scottish supported by the 1st Hussars and concentrated artillery fire. 

We tend to downplay this battle, preferring to follow the successful advance and defence of the Regina Rifles a few klicks away, when they defeated a counterattack by a battalion of 25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment supported by 12 SS Panzer Regiment.

 

[Kirkhill]

It seems to me that the only secure position is one in which the flanks are secure.  Which, unless you are dealing with WW1 conditions and have millions of men available to cover a linear front of hundreds of miles (and an enemy willing to recognize neutral territory as off limits), means the only viable formation is a circular one.

The consequence of a circular formation is that it circumscribes, contains and limits the force to the manpower within the perimeter.  The force can be outflanked and reduced.  So it always seems to come down to: "When do you choose to fight?"  and "How".

Sooner or later you are going to be in the position of deciding what to do with the last man at your disposal (your reserve).  Will you order him to die in place (depth)? To charge (counter-attack)? Or to surrender? Or to hang on hoping for things to improve?

World War 1 had lots of support in depth.  It took four years to thin out the lines.

 

[Infanteer]

This Cbt Tm in Ops Pam I'm reviewing explicitly states that depth should be included in the counter moves plan.  I'm pretty sure that's the only place I've seen that.

I think a depth sub unit as part of a BG could quickly find themselves overwhelmed with the number of tasks given if the expectation that they do everything that a c-movs force has to do along with preparing a BP and conducting patrolling.  It'd be great to find a good historical vignette on this....

Is depth out of enemy artillery range, or is it just behind the guys on the FEBA?

If its the former (which I think is probably a better use of the term) than a combat team as part of a battle group will never be in depth.  Just look at the range of common artillery systems.  Depth is a Battalion or Brigade task within a Brigade or Divisional context.

If depth is just "behind the guys in front," then I guess a Combat Team could be in depth.

 

[b00161400]

Is depth out of enemy artillery range, or is it just behind the guys on the FEBA?

If its the former (which I think is probably a better use of the term) than a combat team as part of a battle group will never be in depth.  Just look at the range of common artillery systems.  Depth is a Battalion or Brigade task within a Brigade or Divisional context.

If depth is just "behind the guys in front," then I guess a Combat Team could be in depth.

As per our doctrine and practice we try to have depth at every level.  Depth trenches, sects, platoons, coys, and on.  So some depth is out of artillery range but a lot of it isn't.  The depth BG might be out tube artillery range but almost defiantly not out of rocket range.  The depth Bde might be out of range of both, but all of this depends on the frontage and depth of the defensive sector. 

All our doctrine talks about our concept of depth being about absorbing the momentum of the enemy's attack, and I don't necessarily see anything wrong with this concept.  Infantry Battalion in Battle had a more holistic approach which described depth as the cumulative effect of all defensive measures in the battalion area (pg 11-3-2).  This means it would include positional depth (the elements behind the ones expected to first make contact), use of covering forces, enganging the enemy with fires early, direct fires out to max effective range, and reserves.  I don't see the concept linked to the enemy's indirect fire, however, at some level (probably Bde and beyond, maybe BG) a Comd is looking to position his reserve, and maybe his depth element outside arty range, but most commanders will not have this luxury.

 

[Infanteer]

All of that sounds about right to me.  I'd argue that at the lowest echelons of combat (company, battalion) you're probably going want to position elements in depth to mask them somehow from enemy direct fires.  If I'm a Bn CO, I'll pop a company in front in a series of strongpoints, and have the other companies in depth.  By being in depth, they can afford to wait before unmasking their fires as the enemy starts hitting the forward elements, helping to "absorb the momentum of the enemy's attack."

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The need will likely come far faster than we can rearm the ships. The one thing Canada does very well is to fail at correctly predicting the military needs and likely conflicts. Hell even the Brits with their experience and resources failed to prepare for the Falklands, Had the Arges waited a bit long the RN would have had even less resources.

 

[dimsum]

The one thing Canada every country does very well is to fail at correctly predicting the military needs and likely conflicts.

At the risk of misremembering history, the French knew for a fact that Germany was going to invade again and there are only so many ways to do it by land - hence the Maginot Line. 

We all know how that turned out.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

At the risk of misremembering history, the French knew for a fact that Germany was going to invade again and there are only so many ways to do it by land - hence the Maginot Line. 

We all know how that turned out.

Unfortunately, the French didn't think that may be the Germans might do hook through Netherlands/Belgium to outflank the Maginot Line.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Retired AF Guy: In fact the French thought the Maginot Line would force the Germans to do the northern hook (as in WW I with Schlieffen Plan, though not including the Netherlands in the end).  And in 1939 the German General Staff's plan did involve doing just that; the French--and British--had anticipated that and the BEF and the best of French army were stationed in NE France, prepared to march into Belgium as soon as the Germans attacked (which they did in May 1940).

The Germans actually planned to execute the northern attack. Orders to execute it were repeatedly cancelled by Hitler in November and December and into January 1940, mainly because of bad weather. Then a light plane carrying a German officer with the plans crashed in Belgian territory and the Germans had to assume the allies had the plan.

So Hitler went back to the drawing board (he never really liked the initial planning) and adopted the Manstein Plan (Sichelschnitt) for the main Panzer attack to be switched to the Ardennes Forest in Luxembourg and the south of Belgium with the aim of outflanking and cutting off the French and British troops in northeast France, who were expected to move into Belgium thus increasing their vulnerability to being cut off.

All worked out a treat for the Germans. And the 1939 plan might well have been stopped or at least not led to any great war-winning breakthrough. Excuse the potted hiistory.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml

1)

2)

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Infanteer]

Moving forward to the Dyle River line is what doomed the French, not the Maginot Line.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Moving forward to the Dyle River line is what doomed the French, not the Maginot Line.

A couple of decades of a continuous succession weak and ineffective national governments beforehand didn't help much either...

...but that's probably not really within a LAV Captain's arcs.

 

[b00161400]

Spent some time over the last few days reviewing Jim Storr's new book again and discussing the issues with another person who enjoys this stuff. He has enlightened me on some of his conclusions based on his historical research.  Some of the stuff we've talked about:

1.  From a coy perspective four rifle sections provide the framework, the positional elements, of the defence.  The are what would have been called in WW 2 the Main Line of Resistance.  These sections with an automatic weapon, spread out as much as 500m ground allowing, give a coy a frontage of (no more) than 2000 meters.  Probably closer to 1500.  These sections can defeat an infantry attack.  On top of that framework layer on anti armour weapons and indirect fire and you have the start of defeating a combined arms attack.

2.  Depth positions primary role is counter attack to re-establish the MLR.  If they can also have direct fire into the KZ then that is gravy but there will be a conflict with placing them where they are protected from direct fire and allowing them to service the KZ.  They're direct fire will probably be more important ONTO the forward positions.  They are dug in and so should be somewhere they could prevent or limit penetration.  Their tasks sound something like:  BPT CLEAR front right/front left BP. BPT CLEAR neighboring pl/coy BP. BLOCK en penetration...  The c-atk task could potentially be SEIZE or DESTROY I suppose. Depth starting with a platoon's depth section needs to be outside the footprint of an arty battery to ensure it isn't suppressed or neutralized with the lead sections. I won't go into detail on whether elements in depth (particularly at Coy and below levels) are reserves tonight, but I no longer think that it would be totally unreasonable to see them that way and some of our allies do describe them as reserves.  That is discussed earlier in this thread.

3.  The focus on counter attack makes for a much more resilient and flexible defence which is optimized for surprise and shock.  If we say depth = counter attack we now have a situation with a Bn with 8 sections in positional defence and 19 in the counter attack role controlled by pl, coy, and the Bn comd.  This raises the question of how does one echelon these counter attack forces?  You don't want a bunch of piecemeal attacks going in and being defeated in detail.

4.  We need to be thinking about outposts.  This was a common practice in both World Wars and if we want to deceive the enemy as to the location of our MDA then outposts are even more important to an army like ours.  It will be clear to an enemy fighting us when they've reached the MDA as the types of forces they're fighting will change.  They'll go from Coyotes/TAPVs to infantry, LAVs, and tanks.  Outposts provided from the infantry battalions will help the covering force in breaking clean and then engage the enemy and deceive him as to the location of the MDA.  They then make their way back to the MDA after delaying the enemy.  They are likely sections drawn from the depth of rifle coy's or the Bn's depth rifle coy.

 

[b00161400]

Thoughts continued.

5.  There is a significant battle to be fought in the covering force area that I think sometimes gets paid short shrift.  Covering forces are there to deceive the enemy as to the location of the MDA as well as delaying and attriting the enemy.  They will also provide information to the protected force in terms of where the enemy's main effort lies and the composition and disposition of their forces.  The enemy will know that they will fight a security force prior to the MDA and will either try to penetrate it with their own reconnaissance forces without fighting or they'll use a heavier reconnaissance and security force to push off the covering force.  The attacker will also lead with an advanced guard behind their security element to protect the main body, defeat any minor opposition and prevent delay via deployment of the main body.  The defender wants to prevent an attack on the MDA by anything less than the main body meaning the attacker should arrive at the MDA will little information on its composition and disposition, likely forcing them to conduct probing attacks to gain information and thereby dissolving some of their combat power.  Even better if they commit their main body prior to the MDA.  Ideally, the attacker meets the MDA under conditions of uncertainty and executes a hasty attack into a deliberate defence. 

So, the covering force area sees the collision of two forces each trying to determine the purpose of the other in order to best establish conditions for the others defeat.  As the defender you're looking to delay the attacker as much as possible and disrupt his combat power with the early commitment of his main body being the best outcome.  You'd also want to provide sufficient depth to force him to do things like displace his artillery which might provide gaps in his coverage and additional opportunities to strike.  Early commitment of CS assets like engineers would also be optimal, allowing for attrition against mission critical equipment prior to the MDA. Fighting will cause bunching, concentration of forces, which will provide targets for fires. One of the defenders challenges will be to
determine when elements are allowed to break contact.  This is just as much for the covering force as it is in the MDA.  Trying to assess when you've achieved what you wanted in conjunction with trying to preserve your combat power (your soldiers lives) will be a balance. It seems to me that prior to contact you would want to have visualized what the indicators are for things like the attacker committing his main body and opportunities to attrit the reconnaissance elements and the advanced guard as well as having a specific goal to be accomplished within the covering force area.  The obvious one being to achieve a certain amount of delay or attrition but it could include other objectives for destruction of other specific systems or effects on the enemy's march formation and security.

 

[b00161400]

An interesting read back from a SBCT at NTC.  I pulled it from twitter so that's why the flow is a little weird.

I talk a lot about leveraging the SBCTs strength so I want to provide an example from a defense. I started drawing this out about a year before execution, with the goal to get an adversary to waste their S-O from SOSRA and misjudge PLC
In my mind it was Army combatives. Pull them into our guard, transition to mount, slides our knees into their arm pits and sit back on their chest and feed them their teeth. First, we showed our defense to be in a position about 3 km behind where it was
We did this overtly. They planned their Suppression and obscurarion against positions we would not be in. Over the P.O.D. we cached Missiles (roughly 150) forward where we would actually fight from. The positions weren’t well prepared, they were just good ground
to fire Javelins from. We also rehearsed the displacement and occupation over P.O.D knowing that we had about 23 minutes to displace from our atk pos to occupy our primary BP. We did a lot of analysis on what triggers they would use to initiate SOSRA.
We determined a PL that they would cross and initiate and we planned on being on the move by then. It was crucial to be tied into the shadow feed and BCT S2 chat because our plan hinged on that trigger.
During execution, it wasn’t perfect. We were a few minutes late on the read and for a few minutes it looked like a 40 strykers racing across the central corridor. Our lead PLT was destroyed and we immediately committed our reserve.
But the suppression was off, so was obscurarion... and all of a sudden they were pulled into our guard. DF advantage was ceded and Jav fire was massed as 8 platoons put 150 missiles into an enemy within 2km that couldn’t deploy and thought we would be 4-5 km away.
We essentially had them by the collar, hooked the knee, and rolled up into the mount. Massing BN mortar fire and javelins on a confused enemy. Then the knees went into the armpits. AH-64 on station in ABF. Javs - mortars - artillery - AAA wrecking the EA. 8
Teeth fed. A MIP squeezed through and made a dash for the BSA and was mopped up by the BCT Reserve. They employed NPCHEM, Red Air, there was nothing that could turn it back, just reinforcing failure at that point. At the end, there was a BRDM left and nothing else
It’s easy to say ‘leverage strengths, mitigate weaknesses’ but this is what I think it looks like in application. All we did was waste their artillery and forced them to hit LC for LD. Yet that’s all we needed.