Right now the Canada's CBMGs consist of a hodge podge of mixed units equipped with LAV III's on the way for the infantry, M113s, some Coyotes, some Grizzlies and AVGP variants, some units are light infantry without vehicles, and a small number of tanks, about 20-30. This creates logistical nightmares and also costs a lot of money, becaue all units use the same armoured vehicles. A single baseline armoured vehicle will reduce VTech training costs and simplify parts procurement and shipping. In addtion LAV III is wheeled which costs less in terms of fuel and maintenance costs. The LAV III is much faster than any tracked vehicles for battlefield mobility. Tactical mobility across open ground is not however as good as a tank or the best tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), but is better than M113s. They do get stuck more easily in soft terrain such as swamps, deep snow, or very soft sand. They do carry about the same armour and firepower as most modern IFVs (the LAV III Kodiak equipped with add-on armour provides protection from up to 30mm rounds). It is also well known that wheeled IFVs provide better overall protection from mines and have a better combat survivability rate than tracked IFVs due to their wheeled nature. As well, one must remember that soft terrain is not the modern battlefield and it is highly unlikely to be so in the future with 75% plus of the worlds population living in urban areas where the tracked vehicles better tactical mobility in soft terrain does not exist. One must also remember that LAV III is not a tank and therefore should not be used as a tank, therefore new tactics and strategies need to be developed if an all wheeled fleet is adopted.

But what about tanks? A LAV III can not replace tanks. Yes, a LAV III can not fullfill the same role as a tank, because it is not designed to. However, Canada does not need tanks if adopted new tactics and strategies. Tanks are designed to be able to go toe to toe with other tanks. They are extremely expensive to procure, maintain, and to operate. They are also required in large numbers to be effective. Canada's small numbers of around 125 divided amongst three brigade groups and a tank training unit does not provide Canada with the capability to employ tanks. There is still a place on the modern battlefield for MBTs, but not in Canada's army. Canada by maintainin an ineffective MBT capability wastes valuable military finnacial resources that could got towards providing a small number of attack and heavly lift helicopters which are not needed in massive numbers. What would provide direct fire support for the infantry without tanks, missiles are far too expensive? A version of the LAV III equipped with a 105mm cannon turret, either conventional or low profile. It retain the baseline LAV III vehicle, thus providing logistics commonality, and the firepower of a MBT for direct-fire support. Is it not more vulnerable to anti-tank missles than an MBT. Yes, it is, but due to the proliferation of heavy anti-tank weapons that can easily defeat even the most heavily armoured tanks, including US M1A2 Abrams, heavy armour is just as vulnerable. It must be stressed that combat units will use new tactics and strategy that minimizes their weaknesses and maximizes their capabilities rather than utilizing strategies that were designed for a type of warfare that doesn't exist today.

In addition, it most be noted that Canadian have trouble understanding why we need tanks and all the modern tracked IFVs, SPHs, and support vehicles that go with them. And rightly so, why should Canadian's pay to equip a military to fight wars that require tanks and are not likely to occur and that they do not want us involved in. Massive tank battles are the dreams of the "glory" days of warfare. The real battles today are low to medium intensity wars, but high intensity combat (i.e. people are still shooting at you), and peace support operations (PSO) gone wrong that tanks can't get to fast enough before the shooting ends. Many countries that require PSOs by the UN or NATO soldiers to help stabilze the country will not accept heavily armoured tracked military units, because that is considered a loss of their control and sovereingty. Canada's military industry would also be benefited, becuase the LAV III is a Canadian vehicle that can be bought for uninflated prices due to a bulk buy and help in securing foreing military sales for friendly nations.

Without getting too deep into the weeds (I take issue with some of the "facts" above), think about this one.

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80's in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit. The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about. It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role. Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them. Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.

Some parting thoughts:
1. Why continue spending funds to train reservists the fire the 76 mm gun on the cougar when the vehicle should never se operational deployment again? Why not replace the turret with the Delco turret of the LAV III and Coyote? This would train reservists in the same gunnery techniques as their regular force counter parts and make it easier to integrate them in to units preparing for overseas duty.
2. The Australian LAV-25s have the same Delco turrets as on our LAV III, except that some also have TOW launchers on either side of the turret. If Canada had chosen those turrets for the LAV III (or at least on one per Inf Plt) it could have greatly increased tank killing capacity and thereby reduced dependency on MBTs.

Not to mock you in particular, however it disappoints me when I hear someone adopt a quote from it at an O Gp or on a crse. I will engage them afterwards and ask them to elaborate, to which a normal response is a stunned blank look, or occasionally, some keen young officer or sect commander will strike up a conversation.

Clive Milner when the Bge Comd for 1 CMBG had a habit of throwing out the odd qoute, must of had the Coles Notes version.

"The Canadian Armed Forces recently updated all of its Leopard C-1 MBTs to Leopard C-2 standard. In my opinion, this is merely another round of wishful thinking that it has the equipment and therefore capablility to fight a modern mechanized war with heavy armour MBTs and supporting vehicle's. Even tankers must admit that the Leopard C-2 supported Combat Brigades, even if fully equipped with Leopard C-2s, could not go toe-to-toe with a brigade equipped with modern MBTs and supporting AFVs such as the Leopard II's and Marder's or T-80's and BMP-3's that had crew of similar training. Canadian crew's would be decimated, even by a smaller force. The Leopard C-2 is merely an improved vintage late 1950's tank design. Why pretend that Canada has mechanized combat brigade groups that can fight "with the best against the best", when clearly we are not equipped to do so and it is highly ulikely that Canada will ever be.
"Canada would be much wiser to embrace the the interim combat brigade groups that the US is scrambling to create and has just recently ordered 2000 plus LAV III from Canada based Diesel Division General Motors to equip three brigade groups plus spares for training and attrition. These brigades fast and highly mobile, although in some area's tracked vehicle's enjoy advantages such as in severly swampy terrain. They are essentially modern day cavalry brigades supported by substantial numbers of infantry and combat support units such as artillery. These brigades are of use in all war scenarios, even high intensity conflict where they are able to act as quick strike brigades. Although they aren not able to go toe-to-toe with a heavy armour brigade equipped with modern MBTs and AIFV's they can easily run away if they meet stiff opposition. Yes, Canada loses the capabilty to fight even in a very limited heavy armour battle, but is it likely that Canada ever would and since we aren't equipped to do so what person would want to. When or if MBTs are not utilized by the CF, it is even more unlikely that any politician or officer would ever put the military into a situation where they must go toe-to-toe with a well-equipped mechanized armour brigade group.

"The LAV III should be adopted as the sole armoured vehicle in the Canadian Armoured Forces due to its excellent combination of more than adequate tactical mobility and fighting capability and its exceptional strategic mobility. In a high intensity situation Canada could offer battle or combat brigade goups entirely equipped with LAV III vehicles to act as fast strike units where tracked vehicles are too slow, without losing world influence to allies because of riding on past actions (ie. Desert Storm). In medium to low intensity conflicts LAV III equipped brigades are far superior to their tracked counterparts. And in peackeeping scneario the vast majority of parites will have no problem with a well equipped wheeled combat brigade on their homeland, but the many countries will not accept heavily armoured vehicles, because they signal a loss of control to the conflicting parties. Also, when things get out of hand these brigades are able to hold their own. Just my thoughts. Please provide yours, as other critiques could improve improve mine or show mine to be wrong."

quote:

---

Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
Hi Brad,

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80's in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit. The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about. It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role. Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them. Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.

Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.

---

Remember the pictures of our first kick at the CAT trophy in Germany using borrowed Leopard 1A1's, Belgique I believe, they had the original round frying pan turret. Our tankers won.

Tadda, if you examine the turrets of the up grade to the C2, it is a 1A1 turret with a complete add on of angular bins and armour add on's.

We may have made them look aesthetically pleasing and give our iron fist the impression of new kit, but in reality folks, we have stepped back two generations for a turret.

Next up, with our shrinking Bge capabilities and the advent of the LAV family, there was talk of Two light Bge (LAV) Gps, with one back Heavy (tracked).

I personally feel that we should more to an "all LAV" type concept. This will standardize the army from the hodgepodge we have now. It will force a re-thinking of our doctrine and a rewrite of our tactics. In other words a complete re-working of the army from doctrine, tactics and training. I think this would be a good thing by bringing debate to the army and in the end grow from that debate.

Going wheeled in the long run decreases maintaince costs, standardizes training ( and being easier to cross train Regs and reserves). and because we are basically buying from one family of vehs we will be able buy more. (increasing our sustainability something we don't have now with the Leopards)

There is nothing wrong with us doing the- "deploy overseas and be capable of defeating lightly armed enemy forces or to delay heavy enemy forces (a la Western Europe defense against the red hoards) until additional forces could be shipped by boat from the US". This could become our new role, one which could well suit us. As a secondary role, it would be no problem having LAV Bde or Bn in the peacekeeping/making role either.

All other nations who have gone light and mobile and wound up in a shooting war did not do so well.

The Russians relied primarily on their BTR families in Afganistan, Chechnya, and several other regions. The numbers tell the truth, body bags do fit all sizes. The russians understand the need for a mix of track/wheeled, light/heavy.

We are getting into a doctrine that failed the US in Vietnam, light, fast, mobile.

It's nice to take a piece of ground, but you have to put something on that piece of terra firma to keep it. That is were the heavies pay off.

The LAV can do many rolls, which is great, but I question it's overhead protection and survivability on a sustained manouver warfare engagement. You can only shoot and skoot until the fat lady closes all the exits, then it turns in to a turkey shoot.

Read some of the other posts of late, get rid of the head sheds, rationalize our budget, get proper kit, get on with the job.

Choosing vehs and eqpt is a combination of many military factors (the threat and doctrine) vs society factors (culture, resources and politics). The Coyote (LAV II if you will) and LAV III are all a result of a combination of how the military and societal factor mix.

I'm a firm believer that the purchase of the LAV III was the correct one for Canada and for the Army. It provides mix of protection, firepower and mobility at a fraction of the cost of a mechanized force. Considering the missions we've been on in the last decade the LAV III will give us a capability that we've never had before.

If the threat against Canada changes, our eqpt and doctrine can change as well.

Hence, the 113 fleet, Grizzlies and Cougars will for the most part be tossed. Some will be refurbished for MRTs, etc. Once completed we will actually have a fairly robust force that is all mounted in wheeled vehs with a fairly heavy firepower capability. Will we have a fairly modern and homogenous force to boot.

Just because you don't know what the Army intends to do doesn't mean there isn't a plan. If you are not able to access the info over the internet or in your unit. Spend a couple of bucks and do a access to information request and you will be amazed at how much info and plans are out there.

Convert the land forces to a primarily
wheeled fleet of combat and support
vehicles. CLS is to develop a plan to
equip the land forces with wheeled vehicles
for most combat and support functions.
Specifically, CLS will seek PMB Preliminary
Project Approval by end April 2000 for an
ACV replacement for the Leopard and Cougar.

Now lets consider what it says.

1. The plan suggests moving to a MOSTLY wheeled fleet. This still leaves the handicap that wheeled vehicles will not be able to fully exploit their speed, and tracked vehicles will not be able to exploit their ability to travel where wheels cannot. To do either would result in the Bde's assets being spread out and unable to support each other. I hope we all realise at this point in time, that all combat arms are required to be successful in warfare. So my observations stands: the puzzle palace must decide to go all wheeled, or to establish different homogeneous Bde's based on light and wheeled or heavy and tracked.

2. It is not stated that the ACV will be wheeled or tracked; it could be either. IMHO, no one vehicle can replace both the cougar and the Leopard. The Leopard, as a MBT, can only be replaced by another MBT. As a fire support vehicle to the infantry the Cougar sufficiently matched mobility with its APC (Grizzly) counter part, however its 76 mm gun was inadequate, the Leopard in the same role has the desired fire power in its 105 mm but lacks the speed of the LAV III. To truly replace both vehicles in their roles would require a new MBT, and an infantry support gun.

And, as an aside, the plan also calls for the acquisition of NEW LAV ambulances (i.e. not the bison) and the TUA has already been placed an a LAV chassis (I saw one as early as last May). There was mention of acquiring a MLRS system, but mention of field artillery is limited. Should the guns become all SP, or towed. Should they be wheeled or remain tracked? Cougars are not being tossed; they are going to the reserves.

Now to get back to the point, Should Canada go all wheeled, or develop medium/light Bde�s and heavy Bde's? Should we maintain a MBT capability (replace the leopard, or not)? Do you agree with the "Plan?" It seems that the difference of opinion on this topic is actually split by those who feel Canada should prepare for low and some medium intensity conflict, and those who feel Canada should prepare for the entire spectrum of low to high intensity conflict.

As for the SLAV III, I have not seen what their eng version is. The last word was that the Engineers would be converted to a total track unit with modified and newly painted 113 that come from the infantry once they are converted to the new SLAV family. But they way things are going, we are on wait out.

I don't think we'll get to an all wheeled fleet simply due to financial constraints. The refurbishing of the Grizzly and M113 for special variants is a cost saving measure that provides an adequate vehicle...vice the best vehicle for the job. I'll have to check on LAVIII chassis being purchased for Ambs. That is new to me, I'd always heard that the Bisons would.

The Leopard will be in service until at least 2010 and the ACV whatever it will be will come into service around that time. I think its a wheeled vehicle (LAV IV?) with a 105 mm mounted gun system. There are alot of advantages and disadvantages for a MBT or a wheeled veh. We can train for war with wheeled vehicles even if we probably will only be involved in Chapter 6 and 7 missions abroad.

Anyway, we are left with a mix of wheeled and tracked vehicles in the Bde Gp. Should we make our brigades (will there be any left) into heavy, medium or light? While it would look good on paper the separate training requirements and logistical support would overwhelm our system. Heck, we have enough trouble training ourselves with everyone going through the same training!

Canada does not have a military threat against it. Our main threat is in the form of the United States. How can we guard against a nation as big as they are?

Because we don't have a military threat we don't have a large military and it probably wouldn't be a wise use of taxpayers dollars to spend it on expensive hardware. Hence we strike a balance. A vehicle that is capable of training soldiers in war fighting skills, that could be used during a ground conflict in a variety of roles, and is very usefull for peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations. A medium weight capability seems to be the option that covers all avenues. Should it be wheeled? Sure, but is the money there to make it so?

Armoured Personnel Carrier Life Extension Projects
http://www.dnd.ca/crs/home/pdfs/apclife_e.PDF

CF Equipment
http://www.dnd.ca/menu/press/Reports/cds_report/english/anxd_e.htm

"Wow, a FOO vehicle that will bring us into the 21st century"- don't you know we've always had a dedicated FOO veh - the trusty Iltis with its trailer, what more could you want - it has wheels also and can go anywhere and it will start (most of the time) in the 21st century Now if we could get a LAV III for TSM/BSM's veh and a SP version for the 105 now your talking and don't forget a CP version. (that would be our best recruiting tool you could find.) and to top it off it'd be nice to happen before I pull the pin. Ah well wishful thinking

Keep your powder dry

On tracks and soft skin vehicles:

While better that the old M113's the MTVL will still lack the speed to keep pace with all LAV unit. The Engineer SEV, which would be more capable to keep pace w/the LAV, lacks the protection of an armoured vehicle and puts the section members (and therefore the mission) at greater risk.

quote:

---

Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
Hi Brad,

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80's in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit. The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about. It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role. Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them. Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.

Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.

---

quote:

---

Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
Hi Brad,

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80's in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit. The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about. It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role. Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them. Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.

Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.

---

As for the original question about should Canada go all LAV III. The answer is no. The AVGP's and LAV II (bison and coyote) still have life in them. There is also the consideration of roles not well suited to the LAV III (in any of its 6x6, 8x8, or 10x10 configurations). With the iltis reaching the end of its life we should consider the need for an armoured security/liaison vehicle. The Mowag Eagle, Panhard VBL Scout, and armoured Land Rovers come to mind, but there are many other options on the market. We should also look for a Medium Armoured Logistic Vehicle Wheeled (MALVW?) to replace the M548 and in some cases the MLVW. Both vehicles are dated and in need of a fully armoured and wheeled equivalent in forward support roles. Perhaps the German Fuchs (I hear a 8x8 variant has been developed).

Yard Ape

"To refer to the LAV program, yes I am glad that the equip (re-equipping is occurring), it will make it easier to maintain the fleet, and yes provide us with a modern mechanism to present a military presence whether PKO's or whatever. I have a concern as to the general acceptance, but if you starve someone long enough, what ever you give him or her will be greatly appreciated.

The LAV (MOWAG) family serves a very specific role, light, urban, mobile etc. I am concerned that we are adapting it for pretty much every front line function. However, the LAV family as originally designed has an inherent weakness with its top armour. We are strengthening the sides, etc, but the top remains a concern. Yes I am aware of our vision and mission, we have discussed this previously, I make my point again the, vision is vague and we are adopting a program with pro�s and con�s, no clear end solution

What does this have to do with wheel/tire probs. Simple, once the equip is deployed and manned, will this become a long forgotten issue until something goes wrong and someone gets injured or worse. Like the MLVW fleet, it was forgotten about until wheels started falling off.

To my AN, even we the CF have adopted a new anti armour weapon that is designed to strike the top of armour vehicles, the weakest point, hmm. "

. . .

--------------------

--------------------

That being said, it is time to get on with how we will employ this new force. I feel it is time for a radical restructuring of the Bde Armour componet in our chosen direction. The Tank Regiment and Recce Sqn should be replaced with a single Cavalry Regiment. This regiment would consist of the current recce Sqn (in Coyotes) and a medium cavalry sqn (in LAV based armoured cavalry vehicles). The role of the recce sqn would not change from it's present. The medium sqn would serve as a guard/screen against enemy forces (with the primary gaol being to keep thier heavy forces "dumber" than our light), Convoy escort operations, and recce by force.

Fire support to the infantry would be provided by a battalion's direct fire support coy. The personel of a DFS Coy need not be infantry, they would be armour crewmen posted into the infantry battalion. The vehicle employed by the Coy would likely be the same LAV III mobile gun system that the US Interm Bde's are placing directly into the rifle companies.

Brock, I think you have missed the point of what was being said about the "come as you are" wars. The quotes were not suggesting that we are ready to go into a high intesity conflict as we are now. They suggest that when we select our equipment it must be capable of participating in whatever conlfict we go to, and we must buy enough of it to equip whatever formation we send (without borrowing short-falls from other units and making those units inoperational). At the time of the Gulf War and through to today, we have not been ready for the "come as you are" war. We will only be ready when we can say "were ready to go now, but fortunatly have nowhere to go."

I have included a link that shows a 105mm concept, and a few others of interest.
http://www.gdls.com/releases/IAV_Specsheet.pdf

In regard to the come as you are war. I believe I am not missing the boat. The distinction between high, medium, and low intensity conflict must be made. All combat is high intensity when it occurs. I apologize for not being clear. I think Canada should focus on what it can contribute to combat scenarios, I believe that should focus on what we can actually provide. A light mechanized brigade, example 3500-4000 soldiers equipped with a LAV III baseline vehicle is suffficeint for all war scenarios, but must be utilized properly within that context. Our units should be fully trained and personnel levels should be at full strength at all times for combat units. Canada could then fight wars, maybe not every situation in all war intensity levels, but we could provide a credible combat force rather than no combat force as would be the case now. So I agree and apologize for being unclear.

--------------------

It shows the whole family through all three generations (the AVGP is in there w/the first generation). Plenty of different configurations which support the arguments about the ability to make the vehicle fit most missions (is that LAV III 6x6 sporting starstreak AD missles?). I'd like to take back my suggestion about a Fuchs 8x8 as a ALVW; the LAV III 10x10 looks good for the job.

Yard Ape

Combat Vehicle 9030

CV 90105 light tank

CV 90120

Yard Ape

For those who are not content to stop beating this dead horse (or those who just want to know more), try reading through some of these related posts from the old War Diary:

Leopard and Cougar replacement

DND Orders Final Batch of LAV III Vehicles

When they pick the vehicle for the ACV I hope they ask themselves if they want a fire support vehicle for the infantry or an armoured cavalry vehicle which can perform independant of the infantry. I belive the LAV III MGS could perform well in the first role, but not in the second.

I think an armoured cavalry vehicle should take a look at a BMP-3 for variety of weapon systems. A 25 mm bushmaster, a 90 mm or 105 mm cannon, and TOW launchers like those on the Bradley. (I would suggest a 120 mm cannon instead of the 90 mm or 105 mm, and TOW; I do not think a LAV could support such a system though). This vehicle would be overkill for just a fire support to the infantry though.

If we replace the Leopard it should be with another MBT. The ACV should be seen as a replacement solely for the Cougar.

LAV III MGS