Re: "Dolle Dinsdag"
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Posted by Brad Sallows from Burnaby BC Canada on April 23, 2021 at 13:54:17:
In Reply to: "Dolle Dinsdag" posted by Geoff Winnington-Ball on April 23, 2021 at 11:41:20:
Sure, I'll take a stab, even though I only have a general familiarity
with the campaign and am not familiar with events surrounding the day
in question. Generally I am skeptical (and sometimes scornful) of
post-play analyis, particularly if the commentator pulls out all the
war diaries, log states, disposition maps, etc and then says, "See,
they could've done it." Not only is all this information not
available in wartime, but one person couldn't make use of it in a
timely fashion even if you went back in time and dumped it on his desk.
What is useful and important in such analyses is, what information was
available to the commanders at the time and what was their mindset,
affected by such considerations as manpower shortages, logistical
constraints, interallied competition for resources, morale, etc.
Why was the halt "artificial"? Were they waiting for guns to be
brought up, were they overstretching their logistics, was bad weather
interfering with air support, did the commanders feel the troops
needed a pause to refresh and regroup, did the commanders feel the
force was becoming vulnerable to counterattack; ie. is it possible
the authors, who I presume lack military training, missed the true
reasons for the halt?
OK, give them the benefit of doubt and suppose the halt was
artificial. Now one is to make the colossal leap of logic that for
that one day, the German army was so weak in that time and place as
to permit itself to be swept aside and the Rhine breached over the
next few days? No, I think the Germans would've reacted in some
fashion over the next few days.
There were many factors responsible for the outcome at Arnhem, but
I don't think a one-day pause on the Allied far left flank was the
chief one.
Market-Garden was an audacious, bold plan which could've paid
enormous dividends. Commanders weigh benefit against risk all the
time. Too bad the air force wouldn't drop the Brits closer to the
objective, too bad they didn't marry up an infantry division with
Guards Armoured to ensure continued infantry support all the way
so the tanks wouldn't have to pause, too bad the staff planners
didn't properly appreciate the need for more bridging resources
further forward, too bad the Germans decided to give II SS Panzer
Korps a rest in that area. In spite of all these problems, the
operation probably would've succeeded except for the last. Pick
up any commercial wargame featuring Market-Garden and instead of
playing rules-as-written, assume 9th and 10th SS Panzer are in the
general area but further away; delay their arrival by one day and
then play it a couple of times to see how it affects the probable
outcome if the Brits are able to march in and form a defensive
knot around the north end of the bridge.
My main point is this: taking a single event and extrapolating its
effects is questionable, particularly in war and particularly if
one is looking ahead more than a couple of days (in this case
longer than the enemy decision cycle at the operational level).
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